Naturalization, Socialization, Participation: Immigrants and (Non-)Voting

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Socioeconomic theories have long been the cornerstone of political participation studies. However, these theories are incomplete and particularly unsuited to explaining behavior found within immigrant minority communities. While increases in age and education provide skills that ease political participation, if these variables do not concurrently socialize an individual to stronger beliefs about the efficacy of voting and democratic ideals, they will not result in the expected higher participation levels. Prior studies oversimplify the effects of socioeconomic status on political participation. Here, evidence is presented that socioeconomic status variables merely provide the skills necessary for political activity in a suitable political context. Socialization determines how these skills will be manifested.

Turnout rates for American elections have generally lagged behind those in other democracies (Burnham 1965; Powell 1986). After peaking in 1960, American turnout has steadily declined. The near quarter drop translates into millions of nonvoters and arguably poses a threat to democracy. Paradoxically, the best predictors of turnout at the microlevel—age, education, and income—have increased during the same period, giving rise to a “participation puzzle” (Brody 1978). The older, better educated, and wealthy are more likely to vote; yet, as the American public has become, on average, older, more educated, and wealthier, turnout has bafflingly plummeted.

This participation puzzle has produced a wide array of proposed solutions. Interestingly, these solutions retain the assumptions of the puzzle and support the generalizability of its claims. A challenge to the soundness of the puzzle’s underlying structure—that, barring mediating factors, increases in age, education, and income should always correlate with higher participation levels—can scarcely be found. Indeed, the notion that increases in socioeconomic status correspond directly to an increased inclination to vote has long been assumed to apply equally across every sector of the population and in a fashion that proves oblivious to

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time.\textsuperscript{1} This view, however, is becoming increasingly dated and overly general. A survey of the literature bears witness to the pervasiveness of this assumption.

According to Downs (1957), citizens vote when the benefits of participation outweigh the costs. Accordingly, a common premise is that socioeconomic levels should correlate positively with voter turnout as higher socioeconomic status represents a greater "stake" in society, and hence, greater benefits from political involvement. However, since turnout is declining while socioeconomic levels are rising, either costs in other arenas have increased or perceived benefits have decreased. These arenas are hypothesized to run the gamut from the attitudinal and psychological to structural or community-based factors.

Declining turnout rates have been attributed to, among other things, declining belief in government responsiveness, political efficacy, concern over election outcomes, and the strength of party identification (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Campbell et al. 1960; Cassel and Hill 1981; Teixeira 1992). The modern electorate is said to be more withdrawn and psychologically less involved in the political world and, thus, to derive fewer benefits from participation. Others cite the rising number of elections or declining "social capital" (Boyd 1981; Putnam 1995; Teixeira 1992).

In sum, there is no shortage of alleged increasing cognitive costs or decreasing perceived benefits.\textsuperscript{2} A curious point is that each of these solutions is trapped in a rigid pattern of thought. Sometimes subtly, each clearly operates from the assumption that the fundamental structure underlying the participation puzzle is sound. In particular, because they assume that a rise in education directly corresponds to an increased probability of voting, they direct their efforts at determining what additional factors offset that momentum.

This paper adopts an alternative stance by proposing that insight into the general causes of participation and this puzzle in particular is gained when we realize that the electorate is now more heterogeneous.\textsuperscript{3} The purpose is not to propose yet another complete solution to the participation puzzle. My focus hereafter is on

\textsuperscript{1}Education is still widely regarded as a mechanism through which skills are provided. This is evident from recent award-winning publications such as Education and Democratic Citizenship in America (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996). In addition, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1996) have also recently argued that education has no independent effect upon voter turnout. Instead, the role of education in voter turnout is to increase political information and political interest. People with higher education are more politically engaged and thus vote at higher rates.

\textsuperscript{2}While the list presented above is representative of many of the arguments made for declining turnout levels, it is not exhaustive. For instance, other arguments include changes in elite behavior and mobilization (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), assessment of indifference between the candidates (Brody and Page 1973), changes in the negative tone of campaigns (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995), or newly enfranchised groups. The list can be quite extensive.

\textsuperscript{3}The U.S. population was certainly heterogeneous in the earlier part of the century. The arguments here, however, do not include this time period. The arguments include the bulk of the literature on participation, which was written during a relatively homogeneous period in America's history (e.g., Downs 1957; Riker and Orndeshook 1968; Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), and the growing diversity since this time.
minorities, and minorities simply do not comprise a large enough proportion of the population to create the type of effect that is embodied in the puzzle. Rather, the point is that an examination of the puzzle and its proposed solutions highlights a deficiency in the manner in which participation impetuses are viewed. Even the pieces of the turnout puzzle thought to be well understood are more complex than is normally realized. Because immigrant groups are socialized through different channels and thus bring unique experiences to bear upon the political perspective in America, they provide a new degree of variation to the participation data. Clearly, the foundational studies of participation, both deductive and empirical (Downs 1957; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Tullock 1967; Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980 based on a 1970 CPS data set), were developed long before the explosive influx of immigrants in the late 1960s and the more recent diversification of the electorate. These studies have thus become dated as the ethnic character of the U.S. population has changed dramatically.

Table 1 reveals that the number of Asian Americans in California, in particular, has grown tremendously since the relaxation of immigration laws in 1965. In the 1970s, the U.S. population grew by 11% while the Asian American population grew by 141%. In the 1980s, the Latino population grew by 53%, while Asian Americans more than doubled in number. In addition to sheer population growth, Figure 1 demonstrates a dramatic rise in U.S. citizenship. The number of naturalizations in 1996 doubled that of the previous year and was five times the number in 1990. Part of this recent push toward citizenship is the result of the flurry of anti-immigrant laws that restrict and redefine immigrant rights. Legal residents are now faced with increasing burdens and are sometimes denied benefits if they are not citizens. This larger potential voter base may or may not behave in a manner akin to the electorate it augments.

The Logic of Voting

Consider Riker and Ordeshook’s (1968) participation model:

\[ R = PB - C + D \]  

TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>79.1%</td>
<td>74.4%</td>
<td>63.4%</td>
<td>57.2%</td>
<td>50.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Americans</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinos</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Projections provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.

For example, see Proposition 187, the welfare reform bill signed in August 1996 by President Clinton, and the administrative requirement to replace aging Immigrant Identification Cards.
where $R =$ reward for voting—the success of the citizen’s preferred candidate, $P =$ probability that a citizen affects the outcome of the election, $B =$ benefit from the success of the preferred candidate, $C =$ costs incurred by the act of voting, and $D =$ benefits from fulfilling a “citizen duty.” The $D$ term captures additional benefits that may include the desire to preserve the democratic system or the satisfaction that comes from complying with the ethic of voting, affirming one’s efficacy in the political system, one’s partisan preference, or one’s allegiance to the system. In short, $D$ is a socialization variable. It represents inculcated beliefs about voting and the democratic process (Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Tullock 1967).

The cost parameter is linked to age as well as socioeconomic variables such as income, occupation, and education. Education is postulated to have an especially strong effect because it reduces the costs and increases the benefits of voting in multiple ways. First, education increases the cognitive skills that facilitate learning about politics. Second, the better educated receive more gratification from electoral participation. Third, education helps people overcome the bureaucratic obstacles involved in the voting process. The relationship between socioeconomic variables and participation has been shown to be robust over time and with varying systemic influences (DeSipio 1996; Leighley and Nagler 1992).

These theories may not be completely generalizable to minority groups (Jo 1980; Nakanishi 1991; Pachon 1991; Uhlman, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989). The magnitude and extent of the generalizability needs to be explored. One point of divergence could occur because socialization processes have been purported to enforce civic
norms. However, if minorities have informational and social networks that provide unique political information and a different source of political socialization, they may not derive the same sort of satisfaction from affirming allegiance to the political system or have the same sense of responsibility for preserving the democratic process. Arguably, immigrants who travel through separate socialization channels may have a very different cost and benefit structure from native-born Americans.

Specifically, immigrant socialization is affected by foreign-born status and English proficiency. These aspects are likely to have reverberating effects that are manifested in the socioeconomic variables. It is not higher education per se that increases one's likelihood of voting, but rather the socialization process that is provided through education. Likewise, the process of growing older does not increase the likelihood of voting. The socialization associated with an increased amount of time in the United States is the driving force. Socioeconomic status is effective in raising participation levels only insofar as its indicators represent exposure to and embracing of the norms of the American political system.

The foreign-born versus native-born dichotomy provides a sharp distinction in past political experiences. For the native-born, past political experiences provide an understanding of American government, party politics, the voting process, etc. For the foreign-born, past experiences may not have provided the same familiarity with democratic political processes in general, and will not have created familiarity with American politics in particular. English proficiency has a similar effect. Obviously, lack of English proficiency increases the costs associated with voting by exaggerating the associated bureaucratic hurdles. And again, socialization processes are certainly affected when one can only receive information in a language other than English (Deutsch 1966). Different messages are conveyed and different biases are highlighted. Moreover, minority populations have a tendency, whether imposed or voluntary, to establish ethnic communities or neighborhood clusters. Hence, the unique socialization that results from being foreign-born and not proficient in English is furthered by a unique social context (e.g., Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Eulau 1986; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987; MacKuen and Brown 1987).

In essence, socialization processes differ, and the socialization process is the mechanism that determines which elements are prominent in the cost-benefit analysis preceding participation. Past studies of participation have scrutinized populations that were relatively homogeneous with respect to racial composition and socialization processes and have thus neglected this diversity.

Data Analysis

The data set used in this study is a 1984 survey of California residents. The survey oversampled the minority populations and includes 574 Latinos, 335 blacks, 308 Asians, and 317 non-Hispanic whites.

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5 This survey, funded by the Seaver Institute, randomly selected 300 census tracts in the state and then conducted random-digit-dialing telephone surveys within these census tracts. Principal investi-
The analysis proceeds in the following manner. The first discussion examines what variables, in addition to the standard socioeconomic variables, are important in understanding minority voter turnout. Next is an assessment of whether the traditional variables impact minority turnout in a manner akin to the general population. My theory suggests that additional variables will be required to capture the effect of socialization processes that are independent of the socioeconomic effects. Lastly, the magnitude and direction of impact for the socioeconomic variables is determined. Again, socialization should be a factor here.

Additional Variables. Table 2 assesses whether variables in addition to the usual socioeconomic suspects are needed to fully describe minority voting. The dependent variable is turnout in the 1984 presidential election. In the first four columns, the regression models include all of the survey respondents. In the fifth column, the regression includes only those survey respondents who were born in the United States. Since the dependent variable is turnout, and noncitizenship produces an absolute bar on participation, only survey respondents who are citizens are included in this analysis.7

The regression in the first column is a standard socioeconomic status model. Of note is that controlling for only the socioeconomic variables leaves statistically
gators were Bruce Cain and D. Roderick Kiewiet, from whom the original text is available. Certainly a survey from one year and one state is limited in its generalizability. However, this particular data set is rich in at least two very important aspects. The first is the oversampling of minority populations. The second is that the year is ideal for capturing a range of socialization experiences. In particular, a large number of the respondents will have been educated in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. Given the patterns of educational discrimination toward Latinos at this time, these respondents will generally lack English language skills. Perhaps at no other time period would we find as many respondents in this situation. Hence, while the data are perhaps not fully generalizable, their richness is self-evident. The discrimination against Latinos began to change in the 1960s, so language is probably not as influential to this group now. As will become evident, the data from this time period, even when caution is taken as to generalizability, serve to emphasize the results that will be presented.

6 Only the Latinos who identified their ethnicity as “Mexican” were used in the analyses that follow, since the Mexican subgroup comprised 90% of the entire sample of Latinos. This decision was made for two reasons. The first is simply that the proportion of Mexicans in this sample is clearly overwhelming. Second, studying a homogeneous group provides more lucid results than studying a heterogeneous group. Since the Hispanic group has been shown to be heterogeneous in many respects (de la Garza et al. 1992), one should attempt to maintain as much homogeneity as possible.

This data set also distinguishes between the separate Asian ethnicities (Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Filipino, etc.) However, while this information is available, often there were not enough cases within each ethnicity to produce reasonable estimates. Hence, while the analyses would benefit from the separation, the data forces the analysis to focus on the Asian group as a whole. Of course this lack of disaggregation should be avoided whenever possible (Tam 1995).

7 Immigrants who become citizens are very likely to be quite different from immigrants who choose to live in America without becoming United States citizens. Hence, these results cannot necessarily be translated to all minorities. In order to attempt this generalization, more research must be directed at determining why some immigrants choose to become citizens while others do not. Such analysis is beyond the scope of this study and is not attempted here.
TABLE 2
Logistic Regression: Dichotomous Dependent Variable Measuring Voter Turnout

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-2.61*</td>
<td>-2.22*</td>
<td>-2.33*</td>
<td>-2.30*</td>
<td>-3.99*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>-1.17*</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>-0.67*</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>0.48*</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.55*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>-0.67*</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.32*</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.18*</td>
<td>0.12*</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
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<td>0.17*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.29*</td>
<td>0.29*</td>
<td>0.29*</td>
<td>0.29*</td>
<td>0.55*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.68*</td>
<td>0.73*</td>
<td>0.72*</td>
<td>0.72*</td>
<td>0.93*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-English-Speaking</td>
<td>-0.67*</td>
<td>-1.25*</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-Born</td>
<td>-1.33*</td>
<td>-1.65*</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05

significant coefficients for the ethnicity dummy variables. In other words, factors in addition to the traditional explanatory variables affect minority political participation. Analysis by Uhlman, Cain, and Kiewiet (1989) provides some additional insight into what these additional factors may be for minority groups. In particular, with a few more controlled variables primarily related to ethnicity, they were fully able to account for the lower levels of participation among Latinos. However, they were unable to account for the lower participation rates of the Asian Americans. The regressions in columns 2–5 extend their research by delineating the components of Latino political participation and introducing the crucial variable that escaped their explanation of Asian American participation.

8Their list of controlled socioeconomic variables is more extensive than just education, age, and income. In order for them to create insignificant coefficients for the Latino dummy variable, they included the variables age, 65-or-older, some-college, home-owner, head-of-household-unemployed, single-mother, male, percent-of-life-not-lived-in-U.S., non-English-speaking, ethnic-problem, and nonethnic-identity. The last few variables—percent-of-life-not-lived-in-U.S., non-English-speaking, ethnic-problem, and nonethnic-identity—are what they call “immigration-linked indicators.”
In column 2, controlling for foreign-born status and English proficiency, the ethnicity effects disappear completely. Hence, while variations in socioeconomic status explain the differing levels of participation among the majority population, they serve as only partial explanations for the minority population. Other variables (foreign-born status and English proficiency) are needed to account more fully for the differing levels of participation among the minority populations. Once the foreign-born status and English proficiency variables are included, Latino and Asian participation rates are roughly equal to those of blacks and non-Hispanic whites.

The task of unraveling the meaning of these two obviously powerful variables remains. A first attempt at an explanation is seen in the regressions in the third and fourth columns. The third column includes the foreign-born status variable, but omits the English proficiency variable, while the fourth column contains the English proficiency variable but not the foreign-born status variable. Adding the foreign-born status variable fully accounts for whatever effect was left in the coefficient for the Asian American variable. That is, once foreign-born status is included in the analysis, the coefficient for the Asian American variable ceases to be statistically significant. For Latinos, the general effect of being foreign-born is in the same direction, but is less influential since the Latino variable remains significant.

Latino participation rates react in an opposite manner. The independent variables in the fourth column regression include the basic socioeconomic variables in addition to an English proficiency variable. Plainly, English proficiency has an enormous effect upon Latino participation. Once the English proficiency variable is included, the Latino variable loses significance. The coefficient for the Asian American variable declines but remains significant. Hence, for Latinos, in addition to the traditional socioeconomic indicators, English proficiency is a crucial determinant of their inclination to vote.

However, note that the differing magnitudes of effect for the foreign-born and English proficiency variables in these regressions are due in part to the differences in the Latino and Asian American communities. Since both the foreign-born and English proficiency variables obviously belong in a properly and fully specified model of minority voter turnout, the coefficients in the third and fourth column regressions need to be understood in this light. Consider that:

\[
\tilde{\beta}_a = \hat{\beta}_a + \hat{\beta}_f \hat{\theta}_{fa},
\]

(2)

where \(\hat{\beta}_a\) is the restricted coefficient for Asians, \(\hat{\beta}_a\) is the unrestricted coefficient for Asians, \(\hat{\beta}_f\) is the coefficient for foreign-born, and \(\hat{\theta}_{fa}\) is the coefficient when

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9It is interesting to note that controlling for foreign-born status and English proficiency also causes the coefficient for blacks to become insignificant since blacks do not have a large foreign-born or non-English-speaking population. However, a closer examination of the data shows that the sample of blacks includes exactly seven (out of 335) foreign-born blacks who behave similarly. Hence the result as well as the overstatement of the result.
we regress *Foreign-born* on *Asian* controlling for other relevant factors. Similarly for Latinos:

$$\tilde{\beta}_l = \hat{\beta}_l + \hat{\beta}_e \theta_{ef}. \quad (3)$$

where $\tilde{\beta}_l$ is the restricted coefficient for Latinos, $\hat{\beta}_l$ is the unrestricted coefficient for Latinos, $\hat{\beta}_e$ is the coefficient for English proficiency, and $\theta_{ef}$ is the coefficient when we regress *English Proficiency* on *Latino* controlling for other relevant factors. Since we are dealing with dichotomous variables, equations (2) and (3) simply indicate that the foreign-born Asian community is large, and that English proficiency is relatively low in the Latino community.

These variables highlight the major characteristics of the communities. Both the identifying characteristics, the large foreign-born population and the large non-English-speaking contingent, affect socialization. If one lives in a predominantly foreign-born community, socialization processes differ from the norm. Likewise, if a large proportion of the community does not speak English, the lack of English proficiency is not only more likely to perpetuate itself but also to affect the type of information that is disseminated throughout the community. Because alternative sources of media must be sought, socialization is affected by the limited information sources such as Spanish-speaking television, Spanish newspapers, and Spanish slate cards. Thus, ethnic clustering has a large impact on the types of informational and social networks within minority communities.

A caveat exists in that this finding neither implies that foreign-born status has no effect upon Latino participation rates nor means that English proficiency is not causally linked to Asian American participation. We have not tested these propositions. This separate analysis must be completed through a model with interaction terms. Table 3 shows that foreign-born status and English proficiency affect the participation rates of both ethnic groups. The large difference we noted in the logistic regression analysis of Table 2 is simply an artifact of the characteristics of the separate communities.

The differences between the two groups run even deeper when one probes a little further. Consider Figure 2, which displays the differences between different generations in learning English.\(^\text{10}\) By the second generation, Asian Americans have achieved a significant and impressive level of English proficiency. The Latinos are also more proficient, but their rate of growth in this area is eclipsed by the strides in the Asian American community. The lack

\(^{10}\text{It is difficult to apply a traditional generational model for Latinos due to their unique formation as a group (de la Garza 1994). In general, we would expect ensuing generations to be more proficient in English. However, the nature of educational and labor force discrimination prior to the 1960s changes the traditional pattern in the Latino community. Hence, a native-born child in the 1920s who has immigrant parents may well have had as few opportunities to learn English as his foreign-born parents. These data capture some of this effect.}\)
of English proficiency is more enduring in the Latino community. By the third generation, Asian Americans are almost completely proficient in English whereas one in five Latinos is still not proficient. The ways in which socialization differ and the degree to which this is perpetuated within the two communities are striking.

Though socialization processes that differ from the dominant culture exist in both communities, they are not the same process. The new immigrant communities not only differ from the populations they augment, they are even distinct from one another. Blanket theories are thus a disservice to our understanding as they only hide the intricacies within the population. Each community must be understood as a separate entity. However, as populations grow and change, the new communities are not static. When the European immigrants arrived in droves, the Irish were very distinct from the Italians. Such distinctions took time to blur (Glazer and Moynihan 1970; Reedy 1991). Eventually a new culture, distinctly American, appeared. A new blend of democracy infused the political system. Incentives to vote emerged gradually. Moreover, people with higher socioeconomic status found it easier and more fulfilling to be politically active. Homogeneity develops slowly with the advent of assimilation into the new culture. This potential for assimilation into the American political culture remains, and new identities are in the process of being shaped by distinctive experiences in the United States.

The regression in the fifth column of Table 2 recounts this story well. Whereas the previous four columns included respondents who were born either in the
United States or in another country, the fifth column includes only those survey respondents who were born in the United States. We can see that for the native-born minority—after we control for income, education, and age—ethnicity produces no impact on participation (with the exception that blacks tend to have a slightly higher rate of participation than the other groups). The lack of significance in the other ethnicity variables leads us to believe that native-born minorities have the same basic cost and benefit structure as the majority population. Only the foreign-born and non-English-speaking sectors of the immigrant community exhibit significant additional factors that contribute to the decision to vote.

Hence, although the political mind of the current electorate incorporates different calculations for voting, the ensuing generations of these immigrants display an amazing aptitude for closing this generation gap. The native-born group generally behaves politically in a manner akin to other groups in the electorate. An understanding of the future of minority political behavior would thus nontrivially rely upon the patterns of demographic change. The lower participation among minorities is now largely dependent upon being foreign-born and not being able to speak English. However, both of these traits are likely to change as time passes, resulting in later generations having higher participation rates. Since the tide of immigration is still surging, the political future of minorities looks extremely promising. Even if the foreign-born and non-English-speaking minorities always

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11These coefficients are in accordance with conventional wisdom that blacks tend to have higher participation rates than their socioeconomic distribution would imply (Olsen 1970; Verba and Nie 1972).
participate at significantly lower levels, the absolute number of minorities who are not foreign-born and who do speak English will rise. In politics, where numbers matter, these results are critical.

**THE STANDARD SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES.** Including only the standard socioeconomic variables leaves a void in one's understanding that can be filled by the inclusion of additional variables specifically tailored toward the immigrant minority experience. But do the traditional socioeconomic variables exhibit any unexpected effects? Table 4 unravels the effect of the socioeconomic variables with interaction terms. In both models, **Ethnicity** is a dummy variable. The difference between the two models is that in column 1, **Ethnicity** = 1 if the respondent is Asian and 0 otherwise. In column 2, **Ethnicity** = 1 if the respondent is Latino and 0 otherwise. If the traditional model holds for the minority groups, none of the interaction terms will be significant.

The lack of significance holds for the interaction between ethnicity and income. Traditional theories claim that as income increases, so does the propensity to vote. A higher income provides time, interest, skills, a higher stake in politics,

**TABLE 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interaction between Ethnicity and the Socioeconomic Variables</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Asians</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnicity*Income</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnicity*Education</td>
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<td>Ethnicity*Age</td>
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<td>Ethnicity<em>Age</em>Foreign-Born</td>
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Standard errors in parentheses.

\*p < .05
and generally greater political engagement. Table 4 shows that this relationship holds without modification for both Asian Americans and Latinos. Neither coefficient is statistically significant. Hence, ethnicity does not modify the positive correlation between income and turnout. The mechanism causing the positive correlation may differ, but it does not change the direction of the relationship.

However, this consistency does not hold for the other socioeconomic variables. Consider education. For Latinos, the positive effect of education is twice that of the general population. By contrast, for Asian Americans, the effect of education is completely absent. The lack of effect for Asian Americans may be the manifestation of a confounding effect between education and immigrant status. Although it is not possible with this data set to assess how many Asian Americans were educated in another country, education in a foreign land certainly differs from an education in the United States. Note, however, that 59% of Asian Americans who have at least some college education are foreign-born. Compare this with 26% for Latinos. The implication is that Asian Americans are more likely to have been educated abroad. An American education reinforces civic norms and allegiance to a democratic system in a manner that is unique to the United States. The crucial point is that education is itself a socializing process. Although socialization through education can be subtle, its omnipresence is also striking. Voting for class president or ball monitor in grade school seems very innocent but has the effect of reinforcing the American commitment to majority rule. In other countries, especially nondemocratic ones, very different ideals of government and society are inculcated.

Lastly, the age variable tells an interesting story. In general, the pattern associated with life cycle and participation has a parabolic shape. Turnout is typically low among the youngest eligible voters but rises monotonically during the middle years only to decline in later years (Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Explanations of low turnout among the youngest eligible sector are associated with residential and occupational mobility. Among the older sector, infirmities, fatigue, and limitations on physical mobility are usually cited. The evidence of this pattern is strong among the general population. In Table 4, the effect of age is separated for the foreign- and native-born groups. For Asian Americans and Latinos, the effect of age among the native-born contingent does not deviate from our expectations. However, for foreign-born Asian Americans and Latinos, a declining propensity to participate as one grows older is manifested by the negative coefficient. This effect is in line with the theory that the younger, native-born generations are more likely to vote than their older, foreign-born counterparts. Certainly, this bodes well for the future of minority politics, and perhaps foreshadows a future convergence between these minorities and other Americans.

These results strike at the very foundation of the socioeconomic status theories. Age, which has long been held to have a quadratic relationship with turnout, does not exhibit this well-established pattern within the minority communities.
Instead, the relationship manifests greater complexity and urges a reconsideration of an explanation that is evidently too simplistic to be universal. The observed nontraditional effects, both with regard to education as well as age, however, align well with theories of socialization. The life experiences of the younger, native-born sectors have socialized them to a stronger belief in American civic norms. On the other hand, the same norms have not been reinforced in the older, foreign-born cohort. Hence, it is not an increase in age that increases one's propensity to vote. Rather, it is the socialization process that accompanies aging. If this socialization is absent, the increasing propensity to vote with increasing age is absent as well.

Conclusion

The traditional political participation theories have provided great insight into the discrepancies in turnout between different members of the potential electorate. However, the costs and benefits associated with various socioeconomic states are generalizable only within certain populations—specifically, homogeneous populations akin to those that were studied. These populations were largely socialized in America and thus in similar fashions. Due to the recent boom in immigration, however, the demographics of the population are transforming rapidly to include many whose socialization experiences deviate from the norm. The infusion of heterogeneity by immigrant minorities should lead to rethinking the mechanisms behind the cost-benefit structure. As the analysis has shown, a rise in socioeconomic status does not universally increase the inclination to vote. In fact, socioeconomic status variables such as education exhibit a clear effect only insofar as they socialize one to a greater sense of civic duty, greater efficacy in voting, and tighter adherence to democratic ideals.

To be clear, the argument is not against socioeconomic theories. Rather, the claim is that the opportunity to study these new population groups has enriched our understanding of political participation and its impetuses by providing a new source of measurable variation in the population. In fact, future generations may attest to the durability of the socioeconomic theories. Higher voter turnout thus correlates positively with higher socioeconomic status in later generations. As the ability to speak English increases as the years spent in the United States increases, one should expect increasing numbers of English-speaking minorities appearing on the rolls of the electorate. In addition, as more immigrants arrive, one should expect a corresponding increase in the number of native-born minorities appearing in the potential electorate as future generations come of age. Hence, overall turnout levels for minorities should increase as the primary barriers to political participation for these groups lessen. With the passing of generations, the uniform effect of political stimuli could reemerge. In the absence of convergence, however, one should not neglect studying the observable
variation in the electorate and thereby gaining additional insight into the socialization-participation connection.

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References


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